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Americans do not directly buy the coal, natural
gas, or uranium used to generate nearly all the elec-
tricity in the United States. Nor do they see, smell,
or feel those fuels when they use electricity. In that
respect, electricity consumption differs fundamen-
tally from most other consumption goods, includ-
ing our main transportation fuel, gasoline. None-
theless, Americans have de½nite opinions about
the best way to generate electricity because the
fuels used have immediate effects on their electric-
ity bills, as well as on economic growth, national
security, and the local and global environments.
Americans want less reliance on coal and oil; they
want expanded use of wind and solar power; they
want to continue and even expand use of natural
gas; and they are deeply torn about nuclear power.1
A basic goal of public opinion research on energy
is to understand how Americans view their energy
choices. Are they content with the existing ways that
we generate electricity, or do they want to change
signi½cantly the fuels that power the country? If
the latter, what drives that preference? How im-
portant a factor is global warming, or security, or
affordability? The importance of energy as a truly
61
Abstract: Public opinion about energy can be understood in a uni½ed framework. First, people evaluate
key attributes of energy sources, particularly a fuel’s cost and environmental harms. Americans, for
example, view coal as relatively inexpensive but harmful, natural gas as less harmful but more expensive,
and wind as inexpensive and not harmful. Second, people place different weights on the economic and
environmental attributes associated with energy production, which helps explain why some fuels are more
popular than others. Americans’ attitudes toward energy are driven more by beliefs about environmental
harms than by perceived economic costs. In addition, attitudes about energy sources are largely unrelated
to views about global warming. These ½ndings suggest that a politically palatable way to reduce green-
house gas emissions is through regulation of traditional pollutants associated with fossil fuels, rather than
a wholly new carbon policy.public policy matter has never been
greater. Challenges of global warming,
economic competition, possible oil scar-
city, and attendant questions of national
security have pushed energy production
high on the national policy agenda. In
many respects, the environmental move-
ment and public backlash over oil prices
in the 1970s were only preludes to the
challenges we face today.
Little is known about public attitudes
toward electricity generation in general
and about the fuels used in particular.
Perhaps because of the tumultuous poli-
tics surrounding nuclear power and oil
prices in the 1970s, there has been much
public opinion and psychological research
about nuclear power, especially questions
of risk, and some research on oil, espe-
cially attitudes about gasoline prices and
energy companies. There has been almost
no research on coal and natural gas, even
though those two fuels together account
for approximately 70 percent of electrici-
ty generation in the United States.2 And
almost no research compares energy
sources directly or examines why people
prefer one source over another.
The history of nuclear power makes it
painfully clear how important public atti-
tudes are to the development of energy
policy and to the deployment of any meth-
od of generating electricity on a large scale.
Nuclear power promised to become a
great new energy source for the United
States and Europe at the beginning of the
1970s. The United States had invested
heavily in this new technology over the
previous decade, and numerous plants
were planned or under construction. How-
ever, rising fears of safety, exacerbated to
some degree by Cold War fears of nuclear
attack, led to public opposition and pro-
tests against siting several prominent
facilities. The accident at Three Mile Island
legitimated those protests and triggered 
a three-decade-long “nuclear winter” for
the industry, as the development of new
facilities came to a virtual standstill. At
this time, the National Science Founda-
tion (nsf) also began to include nuclear
power as one of its key indicators of pub-
lic opinion toward engineering and sci-
ence. By the 1990s, however, attention to
the issue had faded. Public attitudes were
½rmly against building new nuclear pow-
er plants, and the numbers had not moved
in two decades. nsf stopped asking the
public about nuclear power around 2000.
Social scientists today face the task of
understanding energy choices and public
opinion in a more systematic way be-
cause of the twin challenges of economic
development and global warming. The
prospect of global warming has trans-
formed the debate over energy in Amer-
ican society. How we generate and use
electricity and transportation fuel had
been viewed as a speci½c sector of our
economy, albeit an important one. A ris-
ing threat of global warming has shifted
the debate from one that concerns a spe-
ci½c sector to one that touches on most
aspects of contemporary society and
economy. Further, advances in technol-
ogy for energy use and consumption will
be essential to the transition away from
fossil fuels, and that realization has creat-
ed a strong push in the United States and
elsewhere to be in the forefront of the
next high-tech boom, this one focused on
energy. Global warming and energy in-
novation have put energy back onto the
national political agenda–and in a much
broader way than either nuclear risks or
gasoline price spikes ever did. What and
how the public thinks about energy choic-
es, then, will be critical in making legis-
lative and other policy decisions about
energy use. 
One troubling ½nding that has emerged
from contemporary survey research is the
absence of a connection between global
warming and energy use in public opin-
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electricity bills to solve global warming,
or who say they are very concerned about
global warming, express only slightly high-
er support for expansion of nuclear pow-
er or contraction of coal power–two
changes in the U.S. energy portfolio
thought to be essential to reduce green-
house gas emissions from the electricity
sector. Even if Americans were to become
more concerned about global warming, it
is unclear today whether those concerns
would translate into support for a realign-
ment of U.S. energy policy. Conventional
environmental problems, on the other
hand, strongly influence public attitudes
about which fuels the United States should
use. Accordingly, public policies that re-
duce conventional pollutants would like-
ly have public support and could be de-
vised so as to reduce use of fuels that emit
disproportionate amounts of greenhouse
gases. 
P ublic opinion about energy can be un-
derstood in a common, uni½ed framework.
Such a framework conjectures that peo-
ple evaluate all fuels in terms of a com-
mon set of attributes: affordability, envi-
ronmental cleanliness, security, and so
forth. People evaluate each fuel accord-
ing to those attributes and use them to
formulate preferences about how they
would like the United States to generate
electricity. Attributes have different weight
in people’s thinking; cost may be more
important than security, for instance.
Structuring energy choices in terms of
attributes allows us to think of public opin-
ion not as unique to the fuel type, but as
driven by a common set of considerations.
In a series of public opinion surveys
sponsored by mitand Harvard beginning
in 2002, we have examined the public’s
energy choice by way of two important at-
tributes: affordability (or economic cost)
and cleanliness (or environmental harm).3
Several key ½ndings emerge. First, people
hold beliefs about the economic and en-
vironmental consequences for all the main
energy sources. Individuals do not all per-
ceive the costs and harms of fuels accu-
rately, but at the aggregate level, public
opinion is strongly consistent with elite
assessments of the relative cost and envi-
ronmental harms associated with the
major fuels used to generate electricity.
Second, nearly all respondents in recent
national surveys express a preference
about whether they would like the Unit-
ed States to use more or less of the major
fuel sources for electricity generation,
including coal, natural gas, nuclear pow-
er, oil, and hydro, wind, and solar power.
Third, people value both affordability
and the environment. Individuals express
opinions about future energy use that are
based on their perceptions of costs and
harms. Those who perceive a fuel as less
costly and less harmful to the environ-
ment express a desire to increase use of
that fuel. Importantly, this pattern holds
across all fuels. Perceptions of the eco-
nomics and the environmental harms
strongly predict preferences about the use
of each energy source. 
Thinking about energy choices in this
way allows us to characterize public opin-
ion in terms of publicly acceptable alter-
natives. That is, we can think of energy
policy as choices about different attributes
of the U.S. electricity generation port-
folio. Rather than conceiving of the port-
folio as many unique and distinctive fuel
sources, we characterize public opinion on
energy according to a handful of attributes.
Consider the two attributes of affordabil-
ity to consumers and environmental clean-
liness. We can map out how affordable and
clean the public perceives each fuel source
to be. Then, using the relative weight of
cost and environmental harm, we can as-
sess how the public weighs costs and
harms relative to each other in evaluating
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tively inexpensive but environmentally
harmful, such as coal, and fuels that are
relatively expensive but environmentally
less harmful, such as wind and solar pow-
er. The public’s demand for one or the
other of these fuels depends on how
strongly costs and environmental harm
are valued. 
Public opinion, of course, does not
mirror the marketplace. In fact, it may
reflect what does not happen in the pri-
vate sector. Industrial production of elec-
tricity does not fully capture the cost of
environmental harms and damages.4Pub-
lic opinion on energy expresses the rela-
tively high value that people place on fur-
ther reduction of pollution from electric-
ity generation, beyond what is reflected
in prices. 
Most public opinion research on energy
before 2000 was driven by speci½c con-
cerns or events associated with particular
forms of power generation. The gasoline
price shocks, the 1969 oil spill off the coast
of Santa Barbara, the accident at Three
Mile Island, and other events spawned
public opinion research about speci½c
crises.5 The framework presented here
builds on such research, but in a way that
broadens the picture. While each of those
earlier events concerned important as-
pects of the energy system–whether price
or environmental damage–the new wave
of survey research on energy attempts to
measure the bases of public opinion across
the range of energy choices. 
A second long-standing avenue of re-
search on the environment concerns trade-
offs. Since the 1970s, survey researchers
have asked respondents what they think
is more important, “jobs or the environ-
ment” (also formulated as “economic de-
velopment or environment”). This ques-
tion has been criticized as not being
speci½c enough to inform policy choices,
and as not presenting the right choices.
Lower energy costs are often viewed as
the alternative to environmental regula-
tion. Setting these particular concerns
aside, this question attempts to establish
how people will trade off one value against
another. The question seeks to do explic-
itly what we do implicitly: that is, assess
the degree to which people are willing to
trade off higher cost to achieve a cleaner
energy system. 
Finally, survey research on global warm-
ing has greatly expanded. Resources for
the Future, the Pew Center on Global Cli-
mate Change, and Yale and George Mason
Universities, among others, have probed
the public’s willingness to adopt aggres-
sive climate regulations. Most of this poll-
ing asks about climate change directly,
and then about conservation, fuel types,
and other features of energy use in the
context of climate change. We flip this
approach on its head, starting with what
people know about energy and what it
means for designing a publicly accept-
able policy to address greenhouse gases.
T he traditional framing of survey ques-
tions about energy pits jobs versus the
environment. This formulation has been
criticized because it oversimpli½es the true
choices and because it presents a trade-
off that need not always be present. None-
theless, it does capture an essential ele-
ment about energy and the American pub-
lic.All fuels can be thought of as having a
set of attributes, and perhaps the most
important are the economics of provid-
ing electricity using that fuel and the en-
vironmental externalities produced by that
process. There are other important attri-
butes, such as the safety of the produc-
tion process and national security con-
cerns arising from the supply of different
energy sources; however, most public de-
bate and opinion research concerns the
economics of providing electricity and the
environmental side effects. 
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the  mit Energy Initiative gauges how
people perceive the economic costs and
environmental harms associated with
each type of fuel used to generate elec-
tricity in the United States today. These
surveys, conducted in 2002, 2003, 2006,
2007, 2009, and 2010, were among the ½rst
to compare public perceptions of and at-
titudes about the major fuel sources. The
surveys ½rst ask, “How expensive or in-
expensive is it to use each of the follow-
ing fuel sources?” For each fuel source,
respondents are provided a range of
options, from “very expensive” to “very
cheap.” The surveys also ask: “Different
ways of producing electricity cause pollu-
tion, such as air pollution, water pollution,
and toxic wastes. How harmful do you
think each of the following is to the envi-
ronment?” Respondents are allowed to
evaluate each on a scale from “very harm-
ful” to “not harmful at all.” 
A fairly consistent pattern of responses
emerges in all the energy surveys. On the
question of environmental harm, Ameri-
cans see a wide gulf between traditional
and “alternative” fuels. Americans, on the
whole, think that coal, oil, and nuclear
power are harmful to the environment.
They think that natural gas is somewhat
harmful to the environment, and large ma-
jorities view solar, wind, and to a lesser
degree hydro, power as not harmful at all. 
On the question of economic cost, a sim-
ilar gap emerges. The average American
sees oil and natural gas as somewhat ex-
pensive, followed by nuclear power and
then coal. Solar and wind power are
viewed as somewhat inexpensive. Figure 1
shows the average value of the perceived
harm and perceived cost of using each
fuel source, as determined by the 2008
mit Energy Survey. Some of the values
move over the course of the last decade.
Oil, for example, was perceived to be some-
what less expensive at the beginning of
the decade than it was at the end, a change
that reflected rising oil prices.
Responses to these two questions allow
us to map out how people perceive ener-
gy choices according to certain attributes.
Wind and solar, for example, are perceived
to rate highly on both environmental
cleanliness and economic cost. These per-
ceptions are certainly wrong on afford-
ability, which we consider in the ½nal sec-
tion of this paper. Among the traditional
fuel sources, natural gas dominates oil:
natural gas is seen as slightly less expen-
sive than oil and somewhat less harmful
to the environment. In comparison with
natural gas, nuclear power is deemed as
just slightly more harmful to the environ-
ment and somewhat more expensive.
Coal shows an even more dramatic dif-
ference with natural gas; it is perceived as
noticeably less expensive and substan-
tially more harmful to the environment.
(Natural gas is in fact a more costly but
cleaner alternative to coal.) 
T he mit/Harvard Energy Surveys also
ask whether the United States should
increase or decrease its use of each fuel 
to generate electricity. A strong majority
(about 75 percent) wants to increase the
amount of solar and wind power in the
American energy portfolio, while majori-
ties also desire reduced reliance on coal
and oil. These broad assessments are con-
sistent with the ½ndings shown in Figure 1,
but there is a deeper question: which at-
tribute is more important in explaining
preferences? How an elected of½cial or
regulator might make decisions that are
responsive to public opinion depends not
just on how the public perceives different
attributes, but on how much weight these
attributes have. The relative importance
of environment and economics in public
thinking can guide how we as a society
choose between less expensive but envi-
ronmentally more harmful fuels and more
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Figure 1
Perceived Harm and Perceived Price of Energy Sources as Related to Desired Future Use
Bars represent mean value for each energy source. Source: Energy Survey 2008, mit/Harvard Energy Surveys.expensive but environmentally less harm-
ful fuels. In short, how do we decide be-
tween coal and natural gas, and, eventu-
ally, between fossil fuels and renewable
sources?
One can measure the relative weight of
attributes in two ways. First, we use per-
ceptions of harm and cost to predict in-
dividuals’ expressed preferences about
whether they think the country should
use more or less of each fuel type. We
make this prediction by regressing ex-
pressed preferences about fuel use on
perceived cost, perceived environmental
harm, and other factors. Second, we con-
duct experiments in which some survey
respondents are told the actual prices of
producing electricity from each source.
We can then measure the magnitude of
the difference in preferences about which
energy source to use between those who
are given the correct price information
and those who are not. Of particular in-
terest is whether the public becomes less
enthusiastic about renewable sources
upon learning the relatively high price of
those alternatives, and whether the change
in preferences is consistent with the ½rst
sort of analysis.
Figure 2 shows the relative weight of
perceived economic costs and perceived
environmental harms associated with
each fuel in survey respondents’ evalua-
tions of whether the United States should
use more or less of a given fuel.6The graph
shows standardized regression coef½cients
and their associated 95 percent con½dence
interval for each perception. In this graph,
positive values mean that a given attribute
(environmental cleanliness or economic
affordability) is valued more highly.7
Several qualitative ½ndings stand out.
First, Americans value the environment
more than affordability. Environmental
considerations have a stronger effect
than economic considerations in predict-
ing whether people want to increase or
decrease use of a given fuel. The difference
is particularly large for coal and nuclear
power, but it holds for each fuel source. 
Second, the weight given to cost is sim-
ilar (and statistically indistinguishable)
across the fuel types. Prices have approxi-
mately the same effect on people’s think-
ing about energy use regardless of the fuel.
This is an important ½nding, as it indi-
cates that people respond to prices of each
fuel source in the same way. In accord
with economic intuitions, people want 
to substitute more expensive fuels with
cheaper fuels regardless of what fuels are
involved.
Third, the weights of perceived envi-
ronmental harms are about the same for
most fuels. The weights are indistinguish-
able for natural gas, oil, solar, and wind.
Environmental harms have much greater
weight when people think about coal and
nuclear power. Considering that coal is
seen as the most harmful for the environ-
ment, these data suggest a very strong will-
ingness among the American public to
move away from coal, even though it is
cheaper than alternative fuels. 
Fourth, these results reveal that people
think about all fuels through a common
lens. The weights of perceived prices are
approximately the same in public assess-
ments of all fuels, and the weights of per-
ceived environmental harms are approxi-
mately the same for natural gas, oil, wind,
and solar power. This ½nding is somewhat
surprising because solar and wind are
often talked about separately from gas and
oil–as if renewable technologies differ
fundamentally from fossil fuels. Instead,
we ½nd that people think about these
fuels using the same attributes and in the
same ways, though they have different per-
ceptions of those attributes. Coal and nu-
clear power differ from the other fuels in
the environmental domain; people weigh
environmental considerations much more
when they think about whether to use
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ity for coal, suggesting that public support
for increasing its use is highly dependent
on making it into a cleaner fuel (which is
quite expensive to do). 
A ½nal question is whether people
think of environmental harm in local or
global terms. The question analyzed so
far framed environmental harm in local
terms. The surveys also ask respondents
how concerned they are about global
warming and how willing they are to pay
to reduce global warming. In the 2002 mit
Energy Survey, the weight of the measure
of concern about global warming was
statistically indistinguishable from zero
in most of our analyses predicting prefer-
ences about future use of fuel source.
Only for wind and solar power did con-
cern about global warming matter for
people’s thinking about the fuel, and even
then the effect was small. By the end of
the decade, the importance of global
warming in thinking about energy had
risen, but the effect was still much small-
er than the effects of either local pollu-
tion or energy prices. Attitudes about glob-
al warming have weak or no correlation
with attitudes about which fuels we use to
generate electricity in the United States.
The environmental concerns that people
rely on in thinking about energy produc-
tion and policy, then, are local environ-
mental and health considerations, not
global ones.
Experiments provide another way to
measure the sensitivity of future energy
preferences to perceptions of price and
environmental harm. The 2002 mit En-
ergy Survey included an experiment to
measure shifts in attitudes for different
energy sources in light of information
68
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Figure 2
Weight of Perceived Harm and Perceived Price on Desired Future Use of Energy Sources
Source: Energy Survey 2008, mit/Harvard Energy Surveys.about changes in costs and harms. The
survey sample was randomly divided into
½ve groups. Three groups were provided
information about 1) current prices of
power generation and projected increases
in the costs of fossil fuels relative to other
energy sources over the next twenty-½ve
years; 2) current prices of power genera-
tion and global warming threats from
burning fossil fuels; or 3) current prices
of power generation and toxic wastes
generated as a by-product of burning fos-
sil fuels. A fourth group was provided all
three messages, and a ½fth group, serving
as a control, was provided with no in-
formation. Each group was then asked
whether the United States should in-
crease or decrease the use of each energy
source of generating electricity.
The effects of the information were
modest; that is, people’s preferences for
increasing or decreasing the use of a par-
ticular fuel did not differ much for groups
receiving the various messages compared
to the group that did not receive any in-
formation. One notable exception per-
tains to the price information. Compared
to the control group, individuals provid-
ed information about the price of energy
were more likely to support the increased
use of coal, oil, and nuclear power and
more likely to support the reduced use of
wind, solar, and hydro power. These dif-
ferences were each statistically signi½cant,
except for the case of nuclear power. In
other words, upon being provided factual
information about the relative costs of
energy sources, support for traditional
fuels increased, while support for the
increased use of renewable technologies
diminished. There was no similar differ-
ence for the groups provided information
about global warming or toxic waste;
these messages did little to affect prefer-
ences for either fossil fuels or renewables.
The one deviation from this pattern is that,
when provided information about price
and environmental harm (particularly
toxic wastes), respondents on average were
more likely to favor increased use of nu-
clear power compared to respondents
receiving no information. These experi-
mental results show that, similar to the
regression analysis, people do not con-
nect global warming to future policies
about electricity production.
Additional experiments administered
in the 2007 and 2008 mitEnergy Surveys
replicated the ½ndings on cost. When in-
formed that solar and wind power are
much more expensive than coal and nat-
ural gas, support for coal and natural gas
rose slightly, and support for solar and
wind power dropped substantially. 
P ublic opinion research about energy in
the United States points repeatedly to one
unfortunate conclusion: concern about
global warming is, at best, weakly corre-
lated with attitudes toward particular
fuels. That weak correlation suggests that
raising the alarm and public education
about global warming are unlikely to lead
to radical changes in public opinion about
energy production and use. 
The analyses described above reveal
that even if all Americans thought climate
change required immediate action, sup-
port for coal would decline by only 0.10
on a scale from zero to one, support for
solar and wind power would increase by
only 0.20, and support for nuclear power
would actually decline. That result is con-
sistent with a separate literature on Amer-
icans’ willingness to pay to reduce green-
house gas emissions, as well as their sup-
port for climate change legislation and
international climate agreements. With
the exception of recent work by social
psychologist Jon Krosnick of Stanford
University,8 nearly all survey research in
this area shows that people are willing to
approve of only modest carbon taxes or
regulatory changes in order to slow green-
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given the current mindset of many elected
of½cials, policy pundits, and environmen-
tal advocates, is clearly not going to drive
public opinion about energy use and en-
ergy policy.
But there is another way to take on the
climate problem. The results here reveal
that the public is willing to support
changes in the mix of fuels used to gener-
ate electricity when those changes are
based on local environmental problems.
Recent analyses by economist Michael
Greenstone of mit and Adam Looney, a
senior fellow in economic studies at the
Brookings Institution, indicate that much
of the increase in the price of coal needed
to reduce use of that fuel can be accom-
plished through stricter regulation of
local pollution problems, such as emis-
sions of ozone precursors, particulates,
and mercury.9
Regulations that tackle these problems
will help make a ½rst cut at greenhouse
gas emissions from electricity for the sim-
ple reason that those problems arise dis-
proportionately with the use of coal. Such
a regulatory approach is not a climate pol-
icy per se, because it would not regulate
coal for the explicit purpose of decreasing
carbon emissions. However, regulations
aimed at improving local air quality by re-
ducing emissions from coal combustion
would have the effect of also reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by reducing
the use of coal in general. And regulation
of pollution from coal-½red power plants
would likely receive substantially more
public support than similar efforts to re-
duce coal use through regulation of green-
house gas emissions. 
Perhaps the most intriguing ½nding is
the unity that we see across fuels. For de-
cades, survey research has treated opinion
about different power sources as unique.
The new wave of survey research suggests
that people view all fuels through the same
lens. Technological advances that dimin-
ish environmental harm or reduce costs
will make fuel sources more competitive
in the economic marketplace, more ac-
ceptable to the public, and more palat-
able in the political realm.
70
The
American
Public’s
Energy
Choice
Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences
endnotes
* Contributor Biographies: STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE, a Fellow of the American Academy
since 2007, is Professor of Government at Harvard University. His publications include The
End of Inequality: One Person, One Vote, and the Transformation of American Politics (with James
M. Snyder, Jr., 2008), Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize the Electorate (with
Shanto Iyengar, 1995), and The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age (with Roy
Behr and Shanto Iyengar, 1993). 
DAVID M. KONISKY is an Assistant Professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute. He
is a coauthor of the book Superfund’s Future: What Will It Cost? (2001). His research has been
published in such journals as the Political Research Quarterly, State Politics and Policy Quarter-
ly, Public Opinion Quarterly, and American Journal of Political Science. 
1 See, for example, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge,
Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003; updated 2009); The Future of Coal: An
Interdisciplinary  MIT Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2007); Toby Bolsen and Fay Lomax Cook, “The Polls–Trends: Public Opinion on Energy
Policy: 1974–2006,” Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (2) (2008): 364–388; and Eric R.A.N. Smith,
Energy, the Environment, and Public Opinion (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Little½eld, 2002).
2 There has been some effort to understand how Americans weigh energy development and
environmental protection, speci½cally with regard to strip-mining for coal, offshore drilling71
Stephen
Ansolabehere
& David M.
Konisky
141 (2)  Spring 2012
for oil and gas, and the opening of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to gas and oil explo-
ration.
3 The surveys were administered through the Internet by Knowledge Networks to a national-
ly representative group of adult respondents. Knowledge Networks recruits and maintains a
panel of individuals who participate in client-based surveys, such as our surveys of energy
attitudes. 
4For a comprehensive report, see National Research Council, Hidden Costs of Energy (Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010).
5Paul Slovic, among others, saw a broader framework in which to understand opinion about
nuclear power. For more on his risk framework, see Paul Slovic, “Perceptions of Risk,” Science
236 (1987): 280–285.
6The regression also includes control variables for various demographic characteristics (age,
education, income, race or ethnicity, gender, and marital status), political attitudes, and
region of residence. For a similar analysis in the context of not-in-my-backyard (nimby)
attitudes about different types of power plants, see Stephen Ansolabehere and David M.
Konisky, “Public Attitudes toward Construction of New Power Plants,” Public Opinion Quar-
terly 73 (3) (2009): 566–577.
7Standardized regression coef½cients allow for more direct comparison of the measures used.
One can interpret the expected change in the dependent variable for each standard devia-
tion increase in the measure of interest.
8 Jon Krosnick, “Large Majority of Americans Support Government Solutions to Address Global
Warming,” Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, June 2010, http://
woods.stanford.edu/research/americans-support-govt-solutions-global-warming.html.
9Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, “A Strategy for America’s Energy Future: Illumi-
nating Energy’s Full Costs,” The Hamilton Project (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 2011).